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ABSTRACT
Objective: The aim of this systematic review was to
develop a ‘contributory factors framework’ from
a synthesis of empirical work which summarises
factors contributing to patient safety incidents in
hospital settings.
Design: A mixed-methods systematic review of the
literature was conducted.
Data sources: Electronic databases (Medline, PsycInfo,
ISI Web of knowledge, CINAHL and EMBASE), article
reference lists, patient safety websites, registered
study databases and author contacts.
Eligibility criteria: Studies were included that reported
data from primary research in secondary care aiming
to identify the contributory factors to error or threats
to patient safety.
Results: 1502 potential articles were identiﬁed. 95
papers (representing 83 studies) which met the
inclusion criteria were included, and 1676 contributory
factors extracted. Initial coding of contributory factors
by two independent reviewers resulted in 20 domains
(eg, team factors, supervision and leadership). Each
contributory factor was then coded by two reviewers to
one of these 20 domains. The majority of studies
identiﬁed active failures (errors and violations) as
factors contributing to patient safety incidents.
Individual factors, communication, and equipment and
supplies were the other most frequently reported
factors within the existing evidence base.
Conclusions: This review has culminated in an
empirically based framework of the factors
contributing to patient safety incidents. This
framework has the potential to be applied across
hospital settings to improve the identiﬁcation and
prevention of factors that cause harm to patients.
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s high-risk organisations
have adopted a systems approach to safety
management.
1 2 This approach recognises
that the immediate causes of patient safety
incidents are errors made by people at the
frontline of operations (eg, in the case of
medication administration, this is most likely
to be a nurse). However, the importance of
a systems approach is that it recognises that
the organisations within which people work
have inherent weaknesses (latent failures)
that can arise from decisions made at more
senior levels (eg, plans agreed, buildings
designed, stafﬁng levels approved, equip-
ment procured) and those external to the
organisation (eg, policies imposed, targets
set, funding decisions, education provision)
and that these failures manifest themselves in
local working conditions that promote
errors. Thus, a focus on individual responsi-
bility for errors is likely to be ineffective as an
incident reduction strategy. Based on this
approach it can be argued that there are two
main strategies to reduce medical error:
reactive and proactive. The ﬁrst relies on
learning from (reacting to) previous inci-
dents to minimise error in the future while
the second is concerned with prospectively
identifying the latent failures within organi-
sations that represent the preconditions for
errors, and addressing these before a serious
event occurs. Incident reporting systems,
root cause analysis of serious incidents, and
case note review are all tools that have the
potential to provide data about the preva-
lence and/or causes of medical errors.
However, there is growing frustration with
incident reporting systems with low rates of
reporting, poorly designed reporting tools
and inadequate feedback all being blamed
for providing data that have little value in
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Original researchimproving safety.
34Moreover, learning across all of these
tools is predicated on the collection of data about the
factors contributing to error.
56To date there is no
evidence-based and standardised list of contributory
factors that can be used as a basis for understanding
causation. Without this, reactive systems are unlikely to
provide the answers we are looking for.
In other industries such as nuclear power and trans-
port, measurement tools have been developed to assess
the extent to which organisational factors (eg, supervi-
sion, planning, communication, training, maintenance)
represent a failure in the system.
1 7 These tools do not
rely on the retrospective analysis of adverse incidents but
instead they allow the proactive monitoring of an orga-
nisation’s safety. However, before such tools can be
developed it is necessary to know what represents
a latent failure within that particular industry. This
systems approach to patient safety is well established in
healthcare since the publication of ‘to err is human’ by
the American Institute of Medicine
8 and subsequent
policy documents in the UK,
91 0and a number of
frameworks for studying latent failures have been
proposed (eg, Eindhoven classiﬁcation,
11 WHO patient
safety classiﬁcation,
12 the London Protocol,
13 the
Veterans Affairs Root Cause Analysis System,
14 the
Australian Incident Monitoring System (AIMS)
5).
However, these frameworks are limited by the lack of an
empirical basis and a reliance on classiﬁcations from
non-healthcare settings
15 16 that are very different to the
structure and nature of healthcare.
The growing emphasis on systems thinking over the
past 20 years in healthcare
17 has meant that there is now
a signiﬁcant body of evidence in the scientiﬁc literature
(eg, retrospective interview studies, real-time observa-
tional studies and aggregated data from incident
reporting studies) that can be used as an empirical basis
for generating a classiﬁcation of the contributory factors
that impact on healthcare in hospitals. Such a classiﬁca-
tion could serve to promote more effective organisational
learning through the redesign of incident reporting
systems and more effective root cause analysis of health-
care incidents. Such a classiﬁcation system could also
inform the development of intervention strategies to
improve safety defences or directly address systems fail-
ures,
18e22 and to guide the measurement tools used to
evaluate policy and service level interventions.
23
Thus, the aim of this literature review was to produce
a framework of contributory factors that contribute to
patient safety incidents within hospital settings. As such,
it represents the ﬁrst attempt to summarise the empirical
evidence in this area and to use this evidence to develop
a clearly deﬁned and hierarchically ordered framework
which describes contributory factors from proximal
(sharp end) to distal (latent).
A secondary aim was to identify contributory factors
that feature most strongly in the literature and which
might therefore be appropriate targets for interventions
designed to improve patient safety. Finally, we sought to
assess the extent to which the contributory factors
that were identiﬁed most frequently varied as a function
of method of elicitation, hospital setting, and whether
or not a human factors expert was involved in their
identiﬁcation.
METHODS
Data sources and searches
The Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews
and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines were followed
in conducting this systematic review. A variety of strate-
gies were used to search the literature to 20 November
2010. Clear identiﬁcation of studies that identiﬁed the
contributory factors of active failures was hampered by
the lack of consistent terminology used across studies.
First, search terms were developed and electronic
database searching was performed across the following
databases: Medline, PsycInfo, ISI Web of knowledge,
CINAHL and EMBASE. Second, the reference lists of
all downloaded articles were manually searched to
identify possible relevant papers. Third, a number of
patient safety organisation websites were searched to
identify other possible published or unpublished
reports. Fourth, registered study databases were
searched using the terms ‘patient safety’ to identify any
ongoing or ﬁnished projects relevant to the current
review that may have provided relevant material. A
summary of these search strategies can be found in
online appendix 1. Finally, key patient safety authors
were contacted and asked to provide details of any
relevant published or unpublished reports. This search
strategy identiﬁed a total of 1502 potential articles. Of
these, 95 papers (representing 83 studies) met the
inclusion criteria and were included in the review (see
ﬁgure 1). All article titles and abstracts were reviewed
for inclusion (by RM). A random sample of 10% of the
titles and abstracts were double coded with respect to
inclusion or exclusion (by RS). The k value of 0.73
indicated an acceptable level of agreement. If there was
disagreement about inclusion or exclusion, the full text
article was obtained and reviewed (by RM and RS) and
agreement reached.
Study selection
Studies were included in this review if they reported data
from:
(a) Secondary care or hospital environments.
(b) Primary research which either speciﬁcally aimed to
identify the contributory factors (often referred to as
370 BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21:369e380. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2011-000443
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patient safety, or reported a clear framework for the
categorisation of contributory factors of errors or threats
to patient safety in the results section.
Studies were excluded if they reported data from:
(c) Active failures as causes of errors or threats to patient
safety rather than underlying latent domains (eg, only
speciﬁc human ‘errors’ causing failure of a barcode
checking system
24).
(d) Contributory factors of behaviours or processes that
were not active failures (eg, factors affecting the likeli-
hood of staff to report serious medication errors in
hospitals
25).
(e) Case studies reporting contributory factors of
a speciﬁc adverse event (eg, Chassin and Becher
26).
(f) Studies that applied proactive risk assessment
methods to identify potential failures (eg, failure mode
and effects analysis) as these papers focused on
exploring potential problems of speciﬁc elements of
a healthcare system or process.
Data extraction and quality assessment
The study characteristics of 83 datasets were coded. All
included articles were blind double coded (by RM and
RS) and data were extracted and uploaded onto
a Microsoft Access database. Kappas are reported only
for dichotomous variables. Articles were coded
according to the following characteristics: country of
origin; description of setting; study method; study
sample; theoretical frameworks informing the research
(following the quality coding framework of Sirriyeh
et al,
27 studies were coded as: explicit use of theorydie,
explicit statement of theoretical framework applied to
research; speciﬁc use of theorydie, reference to speciﬁc
theoretical basis; broad use of theorydie, reference to
broad theoretical basis; or none at alldie, no theory
mentioned); whether identiﬁcation of contributory
factors was a primary or secondary aim of the study
(k¼0.66); whether contributory factors were identiﬁed
by a human factors expert (k¼0.79); and ﬁnally, whether
patients or staff reported the raw data used to identify
contributory factors (k¼1dperfect agreement). Studies
varied in the extent to which they used primary data
collection methods to elicit contributory factors or
whether they used a predeﬁned set of contributory
factors, therefore the following additional information
was gathered to glean more details about the elicitation
of contributory factors: whether the contributory factor
list was fully developed before empirical data were
collected (yes or no, k¼0.74); the method for eliciting
contributory factors (if different from the overall study
method); and any further details about the sample used
to elicit contributory factors if different or a subset of the
overall study sample. Disagreements were discussed and
resolved. As we were interested in how contributory
factors were identiﬁed, regardless of whether this was the
primary aim of the study, we did not engage in any
further ‘quality assessment’ coding, as often, very little
detail about how contributory factors were identiﬁed was
reported. All included papers and extracted data can be
found in online appendix tables 1 and 2.
All contributory factors reported within the papers
were transcribed verbatim onto a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet.
Data synthesis analysis
To develop the contributory factor framework, two of the
authors (RL, a human factors expert and RM, a behav-
ioural scientist) ﬁrst independently grouped all the
transcribed verbatim contributory factor items into
categories according to their underlying semantic
meaning (eg, equipment not working, equipment
failure, equipment malfunction would all be grouped as
equipment failure). Items could be categorised into
more than one category. Second, each author further
Figure 1 Flow chart of search strategy and included studies.
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domains (eg, equipment failure was grouped with
equipment unavailability and insufﬁcient supplies to
become ‘equipment and supplies)’. At this stage the
authors did not explicitly distinguish between latent
conditions and local working conditions. Next the two
authors met to discuss and agree the number of each of
the higher-order domains, and to label and deﬁne them
(eg, equipment and supplies was deﬁned as ‘the avail-
ability and functioning of equipment and supplies’). A
decision was made to include all factors contributing to
patient safety incidents in this frameworkdboth the
proximal factors (eg, active failures) and those more
distal or external to the organisation (eg, design of
equipment and supplies and external policy context).
This process resulted in a framework of 20 domains and
a deﬁnition for each (see ﬁgure 2). Finally, the same two
authors applied the framework, again independently, to
the raw data so as to classify each of the contributory
factors based on the framework and to assess agreement.
At ﬁrst, 10% of the factors were coded and at this stage
agreement was 55%. Following clariﬁcation and modiﬁ-
cation of deﬁnitions (eg, ‘human factors design of
equipment and supplies’ became ‘design of equipment
and supplies’), the remaining 90% of the contributory
factors were coded. Agreement at this second stage was
90%. Disagreements were discussed and resolved
through consensus.
To ensure that the framework had relevance and
meaning beyond the two authors who developed the
initial framework of domains, 10% of the datasets (n¼9)
and their respective contributory factors were extracted
from the database and sent to two academic health
professionals (IW, a general practitioner and JW,
a hospital physician). Both were provided with instruc-
tions, deﬁnitions of each of the domains and were asked
to code each of the contributory factors using the
framework. They were asked to include ‘can’t code’
when they were uncertain of the correct response. Initial
agreement between the ﬁrst two authors and each
academic health professional was 62.5% (RL and RM
with IW) and 85% (RL and RM with JW). After discus-
sion with the ﬁrst independent reviewer (IW) and
further minor modiﬁcation of the deﬁnitions of
domains, agreement rose to 80.1%. Given that agree-
ment with the second reviewer was initially high (85%)
further discussion with this reviewer was not deemed
necessary.
As noted in the introduction, contributory factors can
vary according to their level of proximity to the ‘active
failure’ being accorded to the individual, local working
conditions (eg, management of staff and stafﬁng levels)
or more latent conditions (eg, design of equipment and
supplies). The contributory factors elicited in this review
also reﬂected these distinctions. In a ﬁnal step, an expert
panel of clinicians (n¼5), researchers (n¼8), managers
(n¼2) and lay people (n¼2) were provided with a list of
all contributory factors and deﬁnitions and asked to
identify the extent to which each factor was removed in
time and space from patient safety incidents on a ﬁve-
point scale from 1 (very close in time and space) to 5
(very distant in time and space). Contributory factors
scoring 4 or 5 were deemed to be more ‘latent’ organ-
isational factors, while those scoring 2 or 3 were deemed
to be more related to local working conditions or situa-
tional factors. This allowed us to ground the taxonomy
in a hierarchical framework, which we have described in
ﬁgure 2.
RESULTS
Ninety-ﬁve studies fulﬁlled the inclusion criteria,
reporting data from 83 independent datasets.
28e122 A
total of 1676 contributory factors were extracted. Studies
reported a median of 15 contributory factors each (IQR
8e27). The lowest number of contributory factors
extracted from a study was 3
111 and the maximum was
100.
60 All coded information about studies can be found
in online appendix tables 1 and 2. For clarity of expo-
sition, individual references are not included next to
summaries of study characteristics except to highlight
individual studies. Interested readers can ﬁnd this
information in the online appendix tables. A table
containing all the extracted contributory factors and
their categories is available from the ﬁrst author on
request.
Country of origin
The majority of the studies identiﬁed by this review were
conducted in the USA (n¼34), the UK (n¼13), Australia
(n¼7) and Canada (n¼5). One study reported multi-
national data from 27 countries,
115 one reported data
from three countries,
100 and one reported data from the
USA and Canada.
121
Setting
Thirty studies reported data collected from general
hospital settings. Other studies focused particularly on
intensive care on its own (n¼17), in combination with
coronary care (n¼1) or in combination with medicine
and surgery (n¼1); surgery settings (n¼16, including
one in combination with intensive care
116); anaesthesia
(n¼7), maternity (n¼2), pharmacy (n¼2); or trans-
fusion settings (n¼2). Other settings included geriatric
and cardiovascular wards,
111 and the emergency
department.
107 Two studies reported incidents from US
general reporting systems (the US Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System,
45 and the National Medication Error
372 BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21:369e380. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2011-000443
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120). Finally, one study reported data from
a cohort of student nurses.
73
Aim of study (primary/secondary) and theoretical basis
The majority of studies explicitly aimed to identify
contributory factors (or more commonly referred to as
causes) of errors or active failures (n¼55). Over half of
the included studies made no reference to a theoretical
basis driving the identiﬁcation of contributory factors
(n¼48). When theory was explicitly mentioned and
related to methodology (n¼8), all studies referred to
Reason’s
123 model of accident causation. Only six studies
included explicit human factors expertise in the elicita-
tion of contributory factors.
Figure 2 The Yorkshire contributory factors framework.
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A third of studies (n¼30) reported data collected as part
of an incident reporting scheme based within the
hospital; see online appendix table 1 for details. Typi-
cally these studies reported the frequency with which
staff identiﬁed contributory factors of a reported inci-
dent from a predeﬁned list (eg, Beckmann et al
33) but
they also included studies in which free text input from
incident reports was analysed qualitatively (eg, Nast
et al
88). Other papers reported results from observational
studies (n¼14), interviews (n¼9) and focus groups
(n¼1), surveys (n¼8) or case note reviews (n¼4).
Seventeen studies reported using multiple methods; see
online appendix table 2.
Use of a contributory factors framework
The coders assessed the extent to which studies had
generated a deductive predeﬁned list of contributory
factors (eg, the London Protocol) which then informed
data collection or whether studies used inductive
methods to elicit contributory factors from participants.
For example, within incident reporting studies, deduc-
tive use of lists would take the form of a tick box list
given to participants, while within interview studies, a list
of closed questions might be used to elicit responses
about particular contributory factors. The use of
a deductive list in these contexts means that no new
contributory factors can be elicited from participants;
rather only prevalence with which they are endorsed can
be assessed.
In total, 46 studies used a predeﬁned contributory
factor list as a basis for data collection. Twenty-six of
these were based solely on previous frameworks (eg, 7
studies used a variation of the Australian Incident
Monitoring study framework,
5 3 studies used the Eind-
hoven classiﬁcation,
11 2 studies used the London
Protocol,
13 and 14 reported frameworks from miscella-
neous previous publications). Seven studies used
a combination of literature reviewing and author or
other expert opinion to identify the list of contributory
factors; one study used previous literature (in addition to
pilot work not reported in the paper
93); and one study
only used expert opinion.
116 Twelve studies which used
a predeﬁned contributory factors list did not specify how
that list was obtained. Two studies were unclear. Of the
34 remaining studies which elicited contributory factors
from analysis of primary data, 25 used qualitative
methods such as interviews, focus groups or free text
coding of incident reports. Eight studies used observa-
tional methods, and two used both.
Identiﬁcation of contributory factors
As described in the Methods section, through the coding
of the 1676 contributory factors, a list of 20 contributory
factor domains was independently identiﬁed by two
reviewers (RM and RL) and this list was veriﬁed by two
further coders (both clinicians, IW and JW). Based on
this list we also sought to identify contributory factors
that were identiﬁed most frequently within the litera-
ture. The number of times each of the 20 contributory
factors was identiﬁed across all of the study settings is
shown in table 1 (total column). Across study settings,
the ﬁve contributory factors identiﬁed most frequently
were active failures (slips, lapses, mistakes, deviations
from policy) (18.2%), individual factors (11%),
communication (7.9%), equipment and supplies (6.6%)
and management of staff and stafﬁng levels (5.8%). This
pattern varied little according to the hospital setting in
which the data were collected, with active failures and
individual factors consistently being the most frequently
identiﬁed contributory factors. However, there was some
variation. For example, team factors (8.5%) were among
the top ﬁve contributory factors for surgery, but for no
other setting. For anaesthesia, equipment and supplies
was the second most cited contributory factor,
accounting for 15.2% of the codes. Physical environment
was also among the top ﬁve factors for anaesthesia. For
the general hospital setting, patient factors (7.4%) were
among the highest ranked contributory factors but
equipment and supplies were not.
Table 2 shows the contributory factors identiﬁed by
each of the different study methodologies. Studies using
incident reporting methodology more commonly iden-
tify active failures than interview or observational studies.
This is intuitive as generally incident report forms are
limiting in terms of the detail of the event which can be
recounted and the options for contributory factors
available to the reporter. Interview studies appear to
more commonly identify individual factors and staff
workload as contributory factors. Observation studies
tend to identify equipment and supplies marginally
more frequently than other methods.
We also investigated variation in the identiﬁcation of
contributory factors as a function of whether or not
a human factors expert was involved in the identiﬁca-
tion. Caution must be exercised due to the low number
of studies explicitly utilising a human factors expert in
the elicitation of contributory factors. However, there
was some evidence that, compared with others, human
factors experts tend to identify active failures less
frequently (11% vs 19%) and identify more latent
contributory factors such as team factors (10% vs 3%)
and physical environment (7% vs 3%) more frequently.
However, despite some evidence that human factors
experts were more likely to identify distal than proximal
causes, they were more likely to identify individual
factors (eg, fatigue, inexperience, 16%) than others
(11%). A similar pattern of ﬁndings was apparent when
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work in developing their contributory factors coding
scheme with those that did not.
Figure 2 is a diagrammatic summary of the ﬁndings of
the review which represents the speculated hierarchical
nature of the identiﬁed domains. The diagram entitled
‘the Yorkshire contributory factors framework’ depicts
the domains as a series of concentric circles, with active
failures at the centre and external policy context as the
outer circle. This diagram helps to illustrate the extent
to which a domain is proximal to the active failure.
DISCUSSION
As early as 1998, Vincent and colleagues produced
a framework for analysing risk and safety in clinical
medicine.
124 In this inﬂuential article, Vincent refers to
Reason’s
123 model of organisational safety, making
a clear distinction between the active failures (slips,
lapses, mistakes and violations) of healthcare profes-
sionals and the latent organisational failures that provide
the conditions in which active failures occur. The past
20 years has seen a proliferation of research using this
framework or similar models to understand the causes of
patient safety incidents. However, to date, there has been
no systematic review of this research and therefore
existing frameworks for risk management have a theo-
retical, but not an empirical, basis.
In this review we identiﬁed 95 studies (83 independent
datasets) that reported on primary research work with
the aim of identifying the factors that contributed to
patient safety incidents. A systematic review and analysis
of these studies suggests that, despite the availability of
frameworks and models that encourage the elicitation of
latent and active failures (eg, the AIMS system
5 asks
people to record any physical environment, equipment
or work practice or policy issues that contributed to the
incident), the overwhelming majority of contributory
factors that were identiﬁed in this review (irrespective of
hospital setting or methodology) were active failures or
individual factors. This tendency to focus on the prox-
imal causes of the incidentdalthough slightly less prev-
alent in our dataset where the reviewer was a human
factors expertdwas ubiquitous, with approximately 25%
Table 2 Frequency of identiﬁcation for contributory factor domain by method
Domain
Incident
reporting
(n[30)
Interviews and
focus groups
(n[10)
Observational
(n[14) Other (n[29)
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Active failures 149 22.6 22 9.8 24 12.6 110 18.2
Communication systems 38 5.8 12 5.4 16 8.4 66 10.9
Design of equipment and
supplies
28 4.3 9 4.0 0.0 14 2.3
Equipment and supplies 55 8.4 4 1.8 20 10.5 31 5.1
External policy context 4 0.6 0.0 1 0.5 4 0.7
Individual factors 68 10.3 54 24.1 12 6.3 50 8.3
Lines of responsibility 2 0.3 4 1.8 0.0 9 1.5
Management of staff and
stafﬁng levels
37 5.6 15 6.7 7 3.7 38 6.3
Patient factors 39 5.9 6 2.7 6 3.2 26 4.3
Physical environment 29 4.4 7 3.1 6 3.2 19 3.1
Policy and procedures 16 2.4 5 2.2 4 2.1 26 4.3
Safety culture 9 1.4 5 2.2 0.0 12 2.0
Scheduling and bed
management
2 0.3 1 0.4 3 1.6 12 2.0
Staff workload 10 1.5 17 7.6 4 2.1 14 2.3
Supervision and leadership 10 1.5 8 3.6 2 1.1 20 3.3
Support from central
functions
23 3.5 0.0 9 4.7 22 3.6
Task characteristics 6 0.9 6 2.7 2 1.1 6 1.0
Team factors 13 2.0 9 4.0 11 5.8 20 3.3
Training and education 17 2.6 2 0.9 5 2.6 15 2.5
Outcome* 9 1.4 1 0.4 25 13.2 22 3.6
Can’t code 94 14.3 37 16.5 33 17.4 68 11.3
Grand total 658 100.0 224 100.0 190 100.0 604 100.0
*Deﬁned as the outcome of a speciﬁc action or a behaviour that impacts on the patient. Outcome was not deemed to be a contributory factor
because it simply refers to what happens subsequently to the active failure, that is, the outcome for the patient.
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of these two domains (active failure or individual factor).
In fact, despite claiming to investigate the causes of
incidents, some studies did not go much beyond the
immediate behaviour, performance or skills of the indi-
vidual who was ‘responsible’ for the incident.
73 96 97
Moreover, even when frameworks include systems
factors, it is revealing that more attention may be given
to the human factors than the systems factors. For
example, within AIMS, 33 codes refer to human factors
while 21 refer to systems factors. Within the Eindhoven
classiﬁcation (MEDICAL
11) there are nine codes that
refer to human failure but only four referring to tech-
nical and ﬁve referring to organisational failure. This
emphasis on human failure, rather than latent failure, is
much less profound in the London Protocol and WHO
classiﬁcations. However, our review found that, to date,
these frameworks have been used less frequently in
published empirical work that identiﬁes contributory
factors.
Our review has informed the construction of a frame-
work of contributory factors which includes 20 key
domains and suggests the extent to which these are
proximal or distal (active or latent failures). This picto-
rial representation is based on previously described
accident causation models,
1 17 together with the ratings
of our expert group. Thus, it should be noted that while
the evidence for the domains reﬂected within the
framework is strong, future research is needed to clarify
the exact positioning of the domains within the outer
rings and the weighting of each domain (perhaps by
varying the size of each segment). Although this frame-
work has a greater number of domains than others (eg,
the London Protocol includes just seven domains and
the WHO classiﬁcation speciﬁes ﬁve main contributing
factors) and therefore might be criticised for being more
complex, it captures the full range of contributory
factors (across different hospital settings) and gives
a greater weighting to systems, rather than human fail-
ures. Moreover, some interesting ﬁndings have arisen
from the work reported here, not least the slight differ-
ences in the identiﬁcation of contributory factors for
different settings. The fact that this framework differ-
entiates between surgery, where teamwork was frequently
identiﬁed, and anaesthesia, where equipment and supply
issues were more pronounced, highlights its potential to
be generalisable across specialties and error types and yet
sufﬁciently detailed to pick up subtle differences
between areas of the hospital to allow the targeting of
appropriate interventions. Indeed, this framework has
the potential to be used in a number of ways to support
improvements to patient safety in practice. It can be used
to improve the root cause analysis of serious patient
safety incidents. For example, it could be used to analyse
patient safety incidents to identify the prevalence of
contributory factors and to provide feedback on the
quality of existing incident analysis processes. The
framework could also be used as a basis for the systematic
collection of data about the factors contributing to
patient safety incidents through the redesign of local and
national reporting systems. The quality of the data
elicited through existing reporting systems is often poor
3
46because healthcare professionals who are responsible
for reporting errors focus predominantly on the indi-
vidual and situational factors that are proximal to
the error. Without guidance on other factors we may
learn little about the organisational interventions that
might better support safer practice. The framework may
also help clinicians or managers to identify proactively
poor safety performance at an organisational level and
therefore guide risk management strategies. For
example, the framework could be used as the basis for
developing a measurement tool for patients to report on
the local and organisational factors that impact on their
care.
The ﬁndings reported here are important but should
be treated with caution for two reasons. First, although
we identiﬁed that active failures, individual factors such
as knowledge and experience of the healthcare profes-
sionals, communication, and equipment and supplies
were the contributory factors most frequently recorded
in the literature, this should not be interpreted as
reﬂecting the reality of accident causation. Almost half
of the studies included in this review (n¼48) did not
refer to the use of a theoretical framework to support the
identiﬁcation of contributory factors and only eight
made explicit links between theory and the identiﬁca-
tion of contributory factors. A third of the studies were
based on analysing the data from incident reports, data
that are often reported to be of poor quality.
125 For
example, some studies simply referred to active failures
(eg, doctor prescribed the wrong drug dose) to explain
another active failure or incident, rather than make any
attempt to understand the reasons for this behaviour.
Typically, incident reporting frameworks rely on those
doing the reporting to select probable causes from
a given list. This is problematic because the person
completing the report may have very little under-
standing of the factors, active and latent, that contribute
to incidents. In addition, when a tick box of contributory
factors is available, this might not represent a complete
list of possible contributory factors. Second, most staff
are not trained in identiﬁcation of systems failures and
may neglect to look further than the proximal cause of
the error (eg, a slip or lapse) when attributing causes to
the incident. Together, the lack of a theoretical frame-
work, the paucity of data available in many of the articles
about the underlying causes of the incidents, and the
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it was impossible to code approximately 15% of the
contributory factors. It is also pertinent that only two of
the studies reported here involved patients in deﬁning
the nature of a patient safety incident or in identifying
causes.
77 117 Therefore, it must be acknowledged that
this framework does not encompass a patient perspective
on the causes of safety incidents. This is certainly
a worthy future endeavour.
While the ﬁndings about the prevalence of the
contributory factors identiﬁed within the studies should
be treated with caution, the variety of methods and the
reach of the research across a range of hospital special-
ities provide strong grounds for arguing that this work
captures the full range of contributory factors. Moreover,
the rigorous process employed for coding the contribu-
tory factors and developing the classiﬁcation of these
factors means that the resulting framework has a strong
evidence base. This is supported by the extent to which
our own framework coincides with existing frameworks
in this ﬁeld.
11e14 The framework (see ﬁgure 2) explicitly
presents contributory factors at a number of different
levels (active failures, situational factors, local working
conditions, and organisational and external latent
factors), which is a welcome addition to the literature.
The majority of studies in this review focused on
understanding the contributory factors through inter-
views with frontline staff and their observations and
analyses of accidents. These staff may not have a sufﬁ-
cient grasp of the higher-level organisational factors or
external policy context that impact on their perfor-
mance and behaviour. Thus, future research should
attempt to further verify the factors in the two outer
circles of the framework. Finally, the clear deﬁnitions
presented within the framework should aid its practical
application, and the reliable attribution of contributory
factors. In fact, without these deﬁnitions the coding task
here (see above) was made much more difﬁcult and
distinguishing between some domains was problematic
(eg, communication and teamwork). Initial pilot work
using the framework to categorise contributory factors
from 44 serious untoward incident reports within three
UK hospital sites has been encouraging, with agreement
between two independent assessors at 80%. This
compares favourably to published inter-rater reliability
of the Eindhoven classiﬁcation (68%, k¼0.63).
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The poor quality of the current evidence base and the
lack of a consistently adopted framework limits the
accurate reporting of factors that contribute to error and
hence the opportunity to learn from error. We
conducted a systematic review of contributory factors
identiﬁed from a wide range of settings using multiple
data collection methods. We then developed an empiri-
cally based framework of contributory factors. This
framework has the potential to be applied across hospital
settings to improve the identiﬁcation and prevention of
factors that cause harm to patients.
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